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1. Introduction 
 
In 1999, countries that wished to qualify for the Enhanced Initiative for the Heavily Indebted 
Poor Countries (HIPC initiative) had to elaborate Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) 
and had to do so with participation of civil society. Since then, the elaboration and subsequent 
implementation of PRSs (Poverty Reduction Strategies) have been seen as a tool for the 
international donor community to guarantee that not only debt relief, but also aid in general 
would be spent well. All low income countries that want to access the concessional facilities 
of IMF (PRGF) and World Bank (IDA credits) must present a PRSP. The PRS approach was 
going to embody the following five principles: national broad-based ownership with 
participation of civil society, partnership with donors, and the plans themselves would be 
comprehensive, long-term and result oriented. Together, the application of these five 
principles was expected to bring about more democratic accountability, more effective aid and 
ultimately more poverty reduction. 
 
The aim of this paper is to assess the experience with this PRS approach in Latin America, 
and in particular in three Latin American HIPC countries Bolivia, Honduras and Nicaragua. It 
is based on a five year (2003-2008) study of these processes, undertaken by a team of 
European and Latin American researchers and funded by Swedish Sida. All three countries 
wrote their first full PRSPs in 2001 and did so with extensive consultation processes. Since 
then, and despite institutional commitments like a “National Dialogue Law” (Bolivia) or a 
“Poverty Reduction Fund Law” (Honduras), the PRS process was not always followed 
smoothly. The countries have undergone several changes in government. New governments 
did not accept “old” strategies, nor were they always willing to elaborate a new one. In the 
meantime, donors wishing to work on the basis of a PRS were in trouble as they either had to 
discontinue disbursements, or they had to assume that current governments were 
implementing the former government’s strategy even when they said they were not. 
 
Especially among donor communities in these three countries, it is often argued that the Latin 
American experience is very different from that in other parts of the world, especially in Sub-
Sahara Africa. In Africa, the idea of elaborating Poverty Reduction Strategies appears to be 
widely accepted by governments. They develop new strategies regularly and present annual 
Progress Reports on their implementation. This practice, in turn, allows donors to work 
together in Budget Support Groups and to align their aid with national systems. In Latin 
America the idea of the PRS has been much less accepted or has been rejected outright, as in 
Bolivia as of 2004, and joint budget support schemes have only come about on a limited 
scale. According to these often heard views, these two facts are related, and they are both due 
to the frequent changes in government occurring in Latin America. These changes and 
instabilities, so the view holds, prevent stable, long-term and comprehensive strategies form 
coming about, and so also prevent donors from maintaining stable aid relations with 
governments. 
 
In this paper we analyze to what extent the Latin American experience really has been 
different from that in other parts of the world. We focus, in particular, on the degree of 
ownership of the strategies, on the extent of participation and democratic accountability, on 
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improved partnerships with donors, and on the implementation of the strategies and the actual 
poverty reduction. While recognizing that there have been more frequent government changes 
in these Latin American countries and that this has had some consequences for the PRS 
process, we argue that the results of the PRS process are not necessarily and in all respects 
much worse than in Africa. In some areas, the results may even have been better than 
elsewhere. 
 
In order to compare the Latin American and the African experience, the paper begins by a 
brief assessment of the results of the PRS process in general. Most of the literature on PRS so 
far has dealt with Sub-Sahara Africa so we rely on this secondary material to describe the 
main achievements with respect to ownership, participation, partnership and results for actual 
poverty reduction. We then examine the results of these processes in the three countries, in 
particular for broad-based ownership and improved participation, improved partnerships with 
donors and for actual poverty reduction. In the conclusion, we highlight differences and 
similarities between the two regions and attempt to explain our findings.  
 
 
2.  Observations about the PRS process in general, mainly Sub-Sahara Africa 
 
Since 2000, 59 countries have elaborated a full PRSP, of which 23 did so twice and three 
countries even made a third version of the strategy.1 Most countries with a PRSP have 
presented Annual Progress Reports (APR) as well, although no country managed to do this 
annually. In Latin America, there are seven countries meeting the criteria for IDA support and 
six of them have an approved PRSP. Nicaragua was the only country that presented an 
approved second PRSP, and the six countries together produced seven approved APRs (Table 
1). In Sub-Sahara Africa, out of the 34 low-income countries, 29 have at least one approved 
full PRSP. Eighteen countries wrote already two PRSPs, and two have three approved 
strategies. The average number of strategies by country (of those countries that have at least 
one approved strategy) is 1.17 in Latin America, and 1.76 in Africa. African countries also 
have more APRs, namely 1.9 versus 1.17 per country.  
 
 
Table 1. Number of PRSPs and Annual Progress Reports (APR) in Latin American low-
income countries 
 Starting 
year 
(1) 
PRSP 
(2) 
APR 
(3) Max 
Possible 
PRSPs 
(4) Max 
Possible 
APRs 
(3)/(1), 
in %  
PRSP 
(4)/(2), 
in % 
APR 
Bolivia* 2001 1 0 3 5 33 0 
Dominica 2006 1 0 1 2 100 0 
Grenada        
Guyana* 2002 1 2 3 4 33 50 
Haiti 2007 1 0 1 0 100  
Honduras* 2001 1 2 3 5 33 40 
Nicaragua* 2001 2 3 3 5 67 60 
Average  1.17 1.17   61 30 
* HIPC countries 
Source: www.worldbank.org and own computation 
 
                                                
1
 Source for these data on approved PRSPs and APRs: www.worldbank.org, accessed 2 February 2009. 
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However, this difference may be due to an earlier start of the process in the average African 
low-income country as the need for debt relief and concessional loans may have been higher. 
For this reason, we compare the actual number of PRSPs and APRs with a maximum number 
of both that could have obtained given the starting year and assuming one PRSP every three 
years (as was the original intention), and APRs in the years in between, after the year of the 
first PRSP. When comparing the actual with the maximum number of possible PRSPs and 
APRs, Africa still shows higher scores than Latin America (Tables 1 and 2). So the 
presumption that the PRS process is more accepted in Africa is confirmed by the more 
extensive implementation.  
 
 
Table 2. Average number of PRSPs and APRs in low income countries with at least one 
PRSP 
 PRSPs APRs PRSPs as % of 
maximum* 
APRs as % of 
maximum* 
Africa 1.76 1.90 74 48 
Latin America 1.17 1.17 61 30 
*The maximum for Africa is computed as in Table 1, see also text. 
Source: www.worldbank.org and own computations. 
 
 
In the remainder of this section, we briefly summarize the evidence to date on the PRS 
process in general, and especially in Africa; focusing on the results for ownership, 
participation, partnership, and poverty reduction. Although countries usually did not take the 
initiative for writing PRSPs, PRSPs may still be nationally owned. The degree of ownership 
depends on the size of the circle of local actors that have a “perception of possession” of the 
strategy (Stewart and Wang 2003). This perception may be limited to the group of technocrats 
who designed the strategy, while it may also include the top political leadership, or key 
political officers such as the Vice-President or the Minister of Finance. Ownership would be 
broader if other ministers who are supposed to carry out the strategy are involved, and even 
more if this ownership is extended to all public sector officers. Finally, ownership is really 
broad-based if it extends beyond government: if it includes opposition parties, a majority in 
parliament, civil society organizations and the public at large.2  
 
Most studies of the original PRSPs that were elaborated in order to qualify for the HIPC 
initiative (the “first generation” of PRSPs) conclude that ownership was fairly limited. It 
usually included the group of technocrats writing the strategy plus some key political leaders - 
those who were most interested in accessing the debt relief. Ownership among other 
policymakers such as the line ministries was limited (Booth 2005; Driscoll and Evans 2005; 
Whitfield 2005; Holtom 2007; Woll 2008). Parliaments were not involved at all. The fact that 
the strategy had to be approved by World Bank and IMF limited the possibilities for real 
participation and thus also for real ownership among the wider society (IEO 2004; OED 
2004). 
 
As a result, and as another proof of limited ownership, the contents of the strategies proved to 
reflect the then dominant international poverty agenda: market-based growth, continuation of 
liberalizations and privatizations, attention for good governance, and a focus on social sectors 
                                                
2
 This is loosely based on the classification in Booth (2003). 
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and social protection mechanisms (Craig and Porter 2003; Stewart and Wang 2003). Yet, this 
similarity may also have been a reflection of the internalization of this poverty agenda by a 
group of key actors in government and society who stood to win by cooperation with donors; 
some countries have become “post-conditionality regimes” (Harrison 2001). Or, as Holtom 
(2007) describes for Tanzania, there was a “Fraternity of economists”. 
 
Little has been written so far on the extent of ownership of later strategies. Woll (2008) 
observes that there was much less interference of donors for Ghana’s second PRSP. Donors 
were not so much interested in the contents but more in the show (the PRS process) 
continuing. On the other hand, high-level political ownership of the most recent (2005) PRSP 
in Uganda was lower than in the two earlier strategies (the 1997 and 2001 PEAP). This is 
explained by the fact that the two earlier strategies had a higher budget and could include 
high-profile and politically attractive measures such as free education and health care 
(Canagarajah and Diesen 2006). 
 
With respect to participation, most authors concur that in practice it was, at best, consultation 
(Stewart and Wang 2003; IEO 2004; OED 2004; Gould 2005; Lazarus 2008). To the extent 
that civil society groups were invited to discussions at the national or regional level, the 
agenda was usually determined by the government. This implied that macro-economic 
policies or structural reforms were not discussed. Useful participation was also limited 
because invitations and relevant documents did not arrive in time, or civil society constrained 
itself as it also had an interest in receiving debt relief fast (IOB 2003). A general critique was 
also that representative local political institutions, such as Parliaments, were forgotten in 
participation processes. When consultations were extensive, and for example included local 
meetings with the poor themselves, there was the generalized difficulty of integrating widely 
diverging detailed demands in a national strategy - both practically, and politically. This also 
held for participation for the so-called second generation PRSPs, for example in Uganda and 
Tanzania where extensive grass roots consultation processes were financed by the donors. 
This led to thousands of pages of reports and that was far too much to be used in the actual 
strategies (Hartog 2005; Canagarajah and Diesen 2006). Actual influence was therefore 
limited. 
 
Yet many authors also maintain that participation processes meant that a larger group of 
actors has become involved in public policies (Driscoll and Evans 2005; Cheru 2006; Holtom 
2007). The Survey on Budget Support carried out for the Strategic Partnership With Africa 
(SPA) observes that there has been an increase in number of actors involved in the 
preparation of the APRs between 2003 and 2007, although Parliaments are still only involved 
in less than half of the countries (SAP BSWG 2007). 3  More critical reviews of participation 
processes for the PRSP argue that the donor attempt at opening political space for non-state 
actors was deliberately meant to increase the power of external actors, both official donors 
and International NGOs vis-à-vis the government (Fraser 2005; Lazarus 2008).  
 
The PRS process was also expected to enhance partnerships with donors. With a government-
owned PRSP in place, donors would be able to support this strategy by non-earmarked aid 
                                                
3
 The 2007 was carried out in 14 Sub-Saharan African countries, Benin, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Kenya, Ghana, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and included 20 
donors. 
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modalities, such as General Budget Support (GBS) and Sector Budget Support (SBS).4 In this 
way, governments would take the lead over the aid process. Many authors concur that 
progress in donor harmonization and in donor alignment with national policies and systems is 
slow (Booth 2005; Driscoll and Evans 2005; Cheru 2006). According to the most recent 
(2007) Annual Survey of Budget Support undertaken for the SPA, the number of donors 
involved in joint GBS agreements in Africa has increased between 2004 and 2007. All 
fourteen countries reviewed in this Survey received General Budget Support, and by 2007, 11 
out of 14 have a formal joint Memorandum of Understanding for its provision. But the 
amount of GBS is still small relative to total aid to these countries: 21.2 per cent, on average. 
If we add SBS, the share of these two modalities becomes 24.2 per cent (SPA BSWG 2008). 
Although budget support was non-earmarked, it was not free of conditions, both in the form 
of underlying principles (macro-economic policies, fiduciary issues, political and governance 
issues, etc.) and to concrete policies and targets to be achieved with budget support. The latter 
are usually jointly (all donors and government) defined in Performance Assessment Matrices. 
In at least one country, Uganda, donors have also agreed on a Joint Country Assistance 
Strategy (Canagarajah and Diesen 2006). 
 
In order to assess the results of the strategies for actual poverty reduction, it is first important 
to examine the contents of the strategies and then the extent of their implementation. With 
respect to contents, the first generation of PRSPs had a heavy focus on social policies and 
suffered from a lack of attention for policies to increase economic growth (Maxwell 2003; 
IEO 2004; OED 2004). This made sustainable poverty reduction more difficult. Another 
generally recognized problem was the lack of priority setting and of operationalization and 
costing of policies described in the PRSPs. 
 
The attention for growth was usually better in second or third strategies, but the lack of 
operationalization remained a problem (Canagarajah and Diesen 2006; Woll 2008). In 
Uganda, for example, the PRSP was in fact operationalized in the PRSC (Poverty Reduction 
Support Credits of the World Bank), while in Ghana costing exercises were mainly done for 
projects that were to be financed by the donors. 
 
The limited ownership among line ministries (see above) also limited an effective 
implementation of PRSPs. In practice, there were only weak links between PRSPs and 
government budgets. Although many African countries have developed Medium Term 
Expenditure Frameworks, these MTEFs are sometimes only existing on paper and do not 
provide real budget constraints, as in Mozambique (Cheru 2006). Donor attempts to reform 
public financial management for example by introducing MTEFs, performance management 
and activity based costing are far too complicated and “drain available capacity” (Renzio 
2006: 632). Budgets are often just a “façade” (Rakner et al. 2004). In Ghana, there proved to 
be an almost 50 per cent difference between budgeted expenditure and actual expenditure per 
ministry, on average (Lawson et al. 2007). On the other hand, the SPA Survey found that in 
an increasing number of countries (but still less than half of the total surveyed) the APR does 
have significant influence on policies and budgets (SPA BSWG 2008).  
 
Studies show that pro-poor expenditure and social sector expenditure have increased in most 
or all HIPC countries (IDD and Associates 2006; IEG 2006). However, definitions are not the 
same everywhere and have often changed over time. In addition, this did not lead to higher 
                                                
4
 According to the OECD DAC definitions of these concept, the only difference between the two is that in SBS, 
the policy dialogue (or the conditions) are focused on a particular sector, while there is no such restriction for 
GBS.  
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efficiency and quality of public service delivery (Lawson et al. 2005; IDD and Associates 
2006). Yet, Sub-Sahara Africa as a whole has experienced improvements in social indicators 
such as the infant mortality rate, access to improved water sources, primary enrolment, 
primary completion rates, and improving gender equity in education (World Bank 2008b). 
The poverty headcount (at the new international measure of US$1.25 a day) decreased from 
55.0 to 50.9 per cent between 2002 and 2005 (World Bank 2008a). 
 
In the next three sections of the article, we will examine in more detail the experience with the 
PRS process in Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Honduras, first with respect to ownership and 
participation, then with partnerships with donors, and finally with policies and poverty 
reduction.    
 
 
3. Ownership and participation 
 
Ownership and participation in the initial PRSP 
 
All three countries were quick in submitting Interim PRSPs in order to reach the Decision 
Point of the HIPC initiative (see Table 3 for an overview of important dates in PRS and HIPC 
process in the tree countries). They then also moved to write the “full PRSPs”, for which 
broad participation was a requirement. The participation processes in Bolivia, Nicaragua, and 
Honduras were quite different from each other. This nature of the process in each country was 
shaped by recent national experiences with participatory planning. 
 
In Bolivia, an important impetus for participatory planning came from the decentralization 
process in the mid-1990s. With the Ley de Participación Popular (Law of Popular 
Participation) 20 per cent of national revenues were distributed to the municipalities. These 
funds were to be spent by municipal governments, based on municipal development plans 
conceived through a participatory process and with oversight from “Vigilance Committees” 
of citizens. The idea of participatory planning moved to the national stage in 1997, when the 
government of President Banzer held a national dialogue, with limited attendance, to discuss 
poverty issues (Komives et al. 2003). 
 
In Honduras and Nicaragua, Hurricane Mitch (1998) and the donor pressure attached to the 
flow of aid provided in its aftermath laid the groundwork for civil society participation in 
policy discussions through the creation of various new committees and civil society networks.  
In Nicaragua the CONPES (National Council for Social and Economic Planning) with 
membership from industry, trade unions, NGOs, municipalities, community organizations, 
and political parties was created in 1999. In Honduras, FONAC (National Fund for 
Convergence) was created in 1998, with representation of the vast majority of civil society 
organizations. In 1999 the Commission for Civil Society Participation was formed to bring 
together FONAC, municipal representatives, and INTERFOROS, another civil society 
network. 
 
This backdrop shaped the nature of the PRS consultative processes in each country.   In 
Bolivia, a Technical Dialogue Secretariat attached to the Office of the Presidency, was formed 
to run the participatory process. This group set up a dialogue process with a heavy focus on 
municipal consultations, and more limited space for civil society. Later, the government also 
made room for two parallel dialogue efforts organized by civil society groups (Komives et al. 
2003). 
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Table 3:  An overview of the PRS processes in the three countries 
 Bolivia Honduras Nicaragua 
Interim PRS January 2000 April 2000 August 2000 
HIPC Decision Point February 2000 July 2000 December 2000 
Original PRS 
Approved 
June 2001 October 2001 September 2001 
HIPC Completion 
Point.  
June 2001 April 2005 January 2004 
PRS Progress Reports 
* if approved as APR 
by IFIs  
Several written 2002-
2003, 
replaced by annual 
monitoring of 
Millennium Goals 
November 2003* 
March 2005* 
June 2006 
November 2002* 
November 2003* 
November 2005*  
May 2006 
Changes in 
Government 
* if as result of 
elections  
June 2002* 
October 2003 
June 2005 
January 2006* 
January 2002* 
January 2006* 
January 2002* 
January 2007* 
 
New National Plans  
* if approved as PRS 
by IFIs. 
Plan for Government  
2002 
Revised PRS 2003 
Bolivia Productiva 
2004 
National Plan 2005 
Emergency Plan 2005 
National Development 
Plan 2006 
National Plan 2002 
Expanded PRS 2003 
Plan for Government 
2005 
Revised PRS 2006-08  
National Development 
Plan (NDP) 2002, 
Revised NDP 2003 
NDP-O 2004 
New NDP = PRS 2*, 
December 2005 
 
 
In Nicaragua, the discussion on the shape of the participation process led to the first meeting 
of CONPES (which before had only had a paper existence). Donors pressured for the actual 
participation process to begin, but the government delayed it. In the meantime donors 
financed parallel processes at the local level. When the formal participatory process was 
finally set up, the results could no longer feed the actual strategy: the government’s desire to 
present the final PRSP before the elections of November 2001 meant that the strategy had to 
be finalized before the consultation process was completed (Guimarães and Avendaño 2003). 
 
In Honduras, civil society groups had a role in organization of the PRS participatory process: 
the government’s “Social Cabinet” and the Commission for Civil Society Participation had 
joint responsibility for organizing the dialogue process.  Invitations were sent to civil society 
groups to participate in discussions and presentations at both regional and national levels.  
According to Cuesta and Cid (2003), all the most influential groups participated in some way 
in the process and one would be hard pressed to find a group that felt it had been actively 
excluded from the process. 
 
Despite the differences in the structure and breadth of these processes, participants in and 
observers of these processes cite similar outcomes and problems.  In all three countries, the 
discussion centred on social issues.  Some topics were not up for discussion, for example the 
macroeconomic framework and unequal access to productive assets (in all three countries), 
topics related to growth and natural resources (in Bolivia in particular), and corruption (in 
Honduras). Civil society was widely complaining that government did not take their demands 
and concerns seriously. Not only in Nicaragua, but also in Bolivia the results of the 
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consultation process were hardly used because a new group of consultants was charged with 
writing a strategy that would meet the expectations of the international community. In this 
stage, ministries were also involved.  
 
This is not to say that the consultation processes had no impact on the strategies.  In 
Nicaragua, civil society (supported by donors) helped argue for attention to governance in the 
final PRSP (Guimarães and Avendaño 2003), and in Honduras the dialogue helped flesh out 
some elements of the government’s initial plan (Cuesta and Cid 2003). In Bolivia, the 
dialogue was instrumental in determining that all HIPC money would be distributed to the 
municipalities, based on a formula that prioritized the poorer municipalities.  
 
Ultimately, the actual influence of civil society groups on the strategies themselves was quite 
limited in the three countries (Vos et al. 2003). As was the case in Sub-Saharan African 
countries, Parliaments were not involved in the participatory process in the three countries, 
but there is little evidence that Parliamentarians were upset by this omission. The strategies in 
all countries were written by a small group of technocrats that was in close contact with the 
donors. Their main objective was to get access to the HIPC relief and in this they succeeded. 
So there was little domestic ownership, let alone broad-based ownership of the strategies. 
Only in Bolivia there was also some influence from other ministries, so that ownership was at 
least to somewhat shared within the government. 
 
Yet, the civil society organizations that participated in the PRS discussions appreciated the 
chance to be heard, in Honduras, particularly the small ones, says Cuesta (2007). The 
processes also strengthened an already active civil society, especially in Bolivia where 
indigenous groups and the small producer network that had taken advantage of donor support 
for civil society capacity building helped increase the pressure on the government through 
protests and highway blockages (Komives et al. 2004). In all three countries, one could say 
that among civil society groups commitment to the idea of continuing participatory planning 
was relatively high in comparison to commitment to the PRSPs themselves. In Bolivia, 
national dialogues were even institutionalized in a National Dialogue Law, which required a 
dialogue process every three years. 
 
Second and third generation participatory processes 
 
In Nicaragua, the newly elected Bolaños administration (2002) quickly announced its 
rejection of the country’s original PRSP; it was seen as a plan written for the donors. Bolaños 
had won the elections on the basis of his own National Development Plan (NDP) which was 
mainly focused on achieving economic growth, not poverty reduction. However, in order not 
to threaten progress towards the HIPC completion point, the government began to produce 
PRSP Progress Reports. At the instigation of the donors, the administration also began to 
revise its NDP to bring it more in line with donor wishes. 
 
The revision if this Plan was accompanied by extensive sector, departmental and municipal 
consultation processes. The reach of this participatory process was much larger than with the 
original PRSP, and in some cases participation was effective in influencing municipal, 
department or sector plans. National level consultation and discussion of core strategy issues 
was much more limited, even in the CONPES, which had been weakened by changes in its 
composition (Guimarães et al. 2004). After several revisions, donors finally accepted the 
revised NDP as PRSP 2 in November 2005. This national strategy had more ownership by the 
government than the original PRSP, but less by civil society actors. In addition, ownership 
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was limited to the Executive as the Bolaños administration had lost all support from 
Parliament including from his own political party - as a result of his bringing to jail of fellow 
party member and former President Alemán who was accused of corruption. With the election 
of President Ortega in 2007, the fate of the PRSP2 (national development plan) and of 
participatory planning processes is unclear.  Ortega did not reject the plan, but has in parallel 
put forward numerous new poverty reduction policies (see below), which have not been 
subject to consultations (Dijkstra and Komives 2008).   
 
Like Nicaragua, Bolivia had a change of government in 2002.  As Bolivia had already 
reached the HIPC completion point by that time, new President Sánchez de Lozada had little 
incentive to continue monitoring or implementing the PRSP. Donors, however, wanted to 
keep the PRS process alive and pushed for a revised strategy. The administration did produce 
PRS monitoring reports in 2002 and 2003.  These were never approved by the staffs of the 
IMF and World Bank, but served as a back and forth consultation between government and 
donors about key elements of a revised PRS (Komives et al. 2004).   
 
Donors and the National Social Control Mechanism, an organization created to provide civil 
society oversight of the PRS process, wanted to see a new participatory process to accompany 
the new strategy. The Sánchez de Lozada government also recognized the value of national 
discussions on central issues of contention, such as gas and land, but kept postponing a 
dialogue due to rising social tensions and street protests. The revised strategy was ultimately 
rejected by the donors at a Consultative Group meeting in 2003 because there had been no 
consultation process. Immediately upon returning from this meeting with donors, there was 
severe violence in the streets, and the President was forced to step down.  
 
Vice President Mesa took over, and he acted in keeping with both the National Dialogue Law 
and donor wishes by organizing a new dialogue in 2004. The National Dialogue for a 
Productive Bolivia aimed to redress a number of criticisms about the first dialogue process: 
the lack focus on production in the original PRSP, the fact that civil society groups had no 
role in agenda setting and lacked capacity to fully participate in the discussions, and the 
absence of government decision makers at the dialogue table. The organizing committee for 
this dialogue included representation from increasingly influential indigenous and small 
producer groups. Donors provided resources for civil society organizations to develop 
productive strategies to bring to the dialogue during a “pre-dialogue” process. Again, 
however, there was hardly any link between dialogue outcomes and the Plan. Furthermore, 
even the Plan went nowhere, since President Mesa also had to resign in mid-2005. He was 
replaced with a placeholder President in mid-2005. Yet, the policy measures that civil society 
groups had managed to extract from the government as a condition of participating, and the 
long-term strengthening effects on civil society organizations of the donor-funded “pre-
dialogue” activities were significant (Jong et al. 2005). 
 
With the election of President Morales in 2006, the new administration made clear that it had 
no intention of preparing a revised PRSP. It came to power with its own National 
Development Plan (NDP). Some further consultations were held but mainly with civil society 
groups with close ties to the government, and the discussions were largely presentations of the 
government plans rather than dialogues. Yet, the NDP and the recently approved constitution 
both call for increased “social control” of government activities and for more autonomy for 
indigenous groups.  It is still too early to tell exactly what shape these will take. 
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Following the pattern in Nicaragua and Bolivia, Honduras’ President Maduro (2002-2006) 
first did not accept the PRSP approved under his predecessor. So as not to jeopardize the 
HIPC process, however, he ultimately decided to preserve the PRSP, write Progress Reports, 
and maintain the tri-partite (government, donor, civil society) Consultative Council of the 
PRS, which had been created in Poverty Reduction Fund Law. As no new plan was created, 
there were no new participatory processes for a few years, but the existence of a Consultative 
Council to which the government had to listen was a step forward in participatory planning in 
Honduras (Seppanen 2005). 
 
In 2005 the country achieved the HIPC Completion Point and a lively discussion about how 
to use the HIPC resources emerged. Far from structuring the decision on how to spend HIPC 
resources, the Honduran PRSP and the procedures established in the Poverty Reduction Fund 
Law took a backseat to new discussions about what projects to fund with resources liberated 
through debt relief.  The Maduro government organized a round of consultations about how to 
use the HIPC funds just before the elections. As had been anticipated, the decisions made in 
these discussions were not respected as the government changed. The newly elected Zelaya 
government (2006-) had other ideas about how to spend the resources, and the Parliament 
began to show interest in the PRS process now that it produced resources. Parliament 
ultimately decided to send a good part of the HIPC funds to municipalities. The drama around 
HIPC resources in Honduras shows that formal recognition of a PRSP and of PRS 
consultation processes do not mean anything when it comes to actual spending decisions. On 
the instigation of the donors, the Zelaya government began to work on revised PRSP. The 
work was mainly done by a consultant hired by the Inter-American Development Bank and 
although several versions have been produced it has so far it not been approved.    
 
Conclusions 
 
From this overview of PRS processes in Bolivia, Honduras and Nicaragua it can be concluded 
that the first PRSPs were mainly written for the donors and that domestic ownership was 
limited to a group of technocrats, often donor-funded consultants. Only in Bolivia ministries 
had been actively involved in designing the strategy. The influence of participatory processes 
on the contents of strategies was limited - but these strategies were merely pieces of paper 
anyway. New governments came to power on the basis of their own National Development 
Plans. Obviously, government ownership of these Plans was much bigger but donors usually 
did not accept these Plans as new PRSPs. They forced governments to either accept the old 
one (Honduras) or to rewrite the strategy to give more attention to donor wishes (Nicaragua). 
Only in Bolivia this did not happen, as the country already achieved the HIPC Completion 
Point in 2001. By the time Honduras and Nicaragua had a further government change in 2006 
and 2007, they had also achieved their Completion Points and the situation with respect to the 
PRS process has become similarly unclear as in Bolivia.    
 
Yet, the participatory processes that were organized around the development of first or later 
national strategies, did have an impact in the three countries. They helped further strengthen 
participatory bodies, civil society networks, and the capacities of civil society actors. In 
Honduras, the participatory process led to the establishment of the PRS Consultative Council, 
which gave a voice to civil society groups that they did not have before. It also provided civil 
society with a chance to be heard by donors, who (as is discussed further below) continue to 
wield significance influence in policy making discussions. In Nicaragua, a similar 
development could be expected from the establishment of the CONPES, but it has lost 
influence during the Bolaños government as he used it for his own purposes (Braunschweig 
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and Stöckli 2006). Furthermore, as donors are not involved in the CONPES, civil society is 
excluded from the real policy discussions (Guimarães et al. 2004). Yet, in Nicaragua the 
participatory processes at sector, department and municipal level did strengthen civil society 
actors and it gave them a chance to influence actual policies at these lower levels. In Bolivia, 
the donor-funding for civil society groups in both the 2001 and 2004 national dialogues, 
strengthened these groups, including the indigenous and small producer movement that were 
protesting against governments. Ultimately this helped bringing President Evo Morales to 
power. It remains to be seen whether the recently adopted Constitution will lead to more 
openness toward civil society groups who are not natural supporters of the administration. 
 
The links between civil society groups and political parties are weak in Nicaragua and 
Honduras (Booth et al. 2006), which means that civil society groups welcome the 
participatory bodies created and/or consolidated in the PRS process as places there they can 
raise issues, ask for information, and generally make their voices heard. However, civil 
society actors use the spaces to have a voice in policy making, more than to monitor a poverty 
reduction strategy or government policies (Komives and Dijkstra 2006). One common 
explanation for weak participation in monitoring and evaluation of the PRSPs is lack of civil 
society capacity (see also (Molenaers and Renard 2006; Eberlei 2007). While this is certainly 
a factor in Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Honduras, much has been done in the name of the PRS 
process to strengthen capacity and provide donor resources to civil society groups. At least as 
important as lack of capacity is the fact that civil society groups have more interest in 
promoting and pushing new ideas and changes in policy direction than they do in monitoring 
the government policies.    
 
 
4. Partnership with donors 
 
In this section we examine what happened in the relations between government and donors in 
the three countries as a result of the PRS process. In particular we analyze to what extent 
donors moved to freely spendable aid modalities, such as GBS or SBS, to what extent 
conditions for these aid modalities were based on the PRSP - or otherwise “owned” by the 
recipient government, and whether governments took on the leadership of the aid process. 
 
A first thing to be noted is that the relationship between the PRS process and the change to 
other aid modalities was not as straightforward as it appears to have been in Sub-Sahara 
Africa. The move from project aid to budget support has also been less extensive than in those 
other countries. Like in other countries, part of World Bank and IDB lending consists of 
policy-based loans (in fact, GBS), and the EC has also turned an increasing share of its grants 
into (sector) budget support as of 2004. But bilateral donors have changed much less in the 
three countries. In Bolivia and Nicaragua joint budget support schemes have come into 
existence around 2004-2005, but only in Nicaragua do disbursements continue to this day. 
The Bolivian program was short-lived: it lasted one year only and hardly led to 
disbursements. Honduras never had a joint budget support agreement,5  which is contrary to 
expectations as Honduras was the country where the PRS process continued to have most 
presence. In Bolivia, by contrast, when the “Multi-annual Budget Support Program” was 
signed, the country did not have an approved PRSP. So the presence of an approved PRSP or 
APR was not necessary or sufficient for the creation of a joint budget support agreement in 
these three countries. 
                                                
5
 Sweden and Germany (KfW) have provided some budget support on their own or linked to the PRSC. 
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Yet, having an approved PRSP did have consequences for the lending operations of the IMF 
and the World Bank. When, in response to severe uprisings in February 2003 the Bolivian 
government and the IMF concluded a new agreement in April 2003, it was a Stand-By and 
not the concessional PRGF. The reason for this unfavourable treatment was that the country 
did not have an approved PRSP. In Honduras, the PRGF concluded in January 2004 went off-
track in 2005. This, combined with a lack of clarity on the status of a new draft PRSP, led the 
World Bank to postpone a new PRSC. 
 
 
Table 4. Amount of program aid* 2001-2006, in US$ millions and in per cent of total aid 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total 
program 
aid 
01-06 
Total 
aid 
01-06 
Program 
aid 
as % of 
total aid 
Bolivia 21 57 381 227 95 19 800 4137 19 
Honduras 27 4 1 51 103 25 210 1628 13 
Nicaragua 38 54 78 90 51 133 443 3291 13 
*Program aid comprises of all freely spendable modalities: balance of payments support, debt 
relief (by bilateral donors on multilateral debts), GBS and SBS. 
Source: Data from Ministries of Finance in Bolivia and Honduras, and from the Central Bank 
of Nicaragua. 
 
 
Table 4 shows the amount of program aid received by the three countries between 2001 and 
2006. In per cent of total aid, only Bolivia comes near the average for the fourteen African 
countries surveyed by the SPA. However, this country received in 2003 and 2004 large 
amounts of balance of payments support in view of the threat of a balance of payments crisis. 
In addition, these figures are overestimated because they include loans from the Andean 
Development Corporation (CAF) which are not concessional so strictly speaking do not form 
part of aid. Excluding both CAF and balance of payments support, Bolivia would present a 
much lower figure than Honduras or Nicaragua. In Honduras the program aid figures are 
slightly underestimated as they do not include grants (but the total aid figures for this country 
do not include grants either). 
 
There are three reasons for the more limited move to budget support in Latin America and for 
the weak link between the PRS process and this change in aid modalities. First, the existence 
of a PRSP was meant to signal the poverty reduction commitment of governments. But the 
limited ownership of the first PRSPs and, perhaps even more important, the subsequent 
rejection of these strategies by new governments made it hard for donors to keep up this idea. 
Having an approved PRSP did not imply such commitment (similarly as in other countries), 
while rejecting it did not automatically imply a lack of such commitment. 
 
Second, although budget support was increasingly stimulated by donor headquarters, 
especially since the Rome and Paris Declaration, this pressure was not the same for all 
donors. Donors like USAID, Canada, Spain and Japan have a large presence in Latin America 
and are much less inclined to provide budget support than the “like-minded” donors such as 
the UK (DFID), Sweden, Norway and The Netherlands. This explains, in particular, the 
absence of a joint donor scheme in Honduras, as Sweden and Germany (KfW) were the only 
bilateral donors potentially in favour of such a scheme.  
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Third, having elaborated a PRSP is not the only entry condition for budget support. All 
donors are of the view that macroeconomic stability must be in place, and usually an IMF 
agreement is taken as proof of such stability. Most donors, and in particular bilateral donors 
and the EC, also give a high weight to governance conditions, in particular fiduciary 
conditions: a certain level of transparency in budget execution and absence of corruption. In 
practice, an IMF agreement as entry condition has played a role in all three countries and for 
all donors, with the partial exception only of IDB and CAF (in Bolivia). The status with 
respect to the IMF explains to a large extent the ups and downs in program aid (Table 4). The 
conditions with respect to governance have not been very important in practice. Donors were 
usually satisfied if there was some evidence of a willingness to improve budgetary processes 
or other governance issues. Ad-hoc political reasons also seem to have played a role in the 
bilateral decisions to move towards budget support. Donors wanted to support President Mesa 
in Bolivia, in 2004, in order to prevent further political and economic instability, and they had 
a large confidence in President Bolaños in Nicaragua because of his fight against the former 
government’s corruption. 
 
As in other countries, the Latin American PRSPs did not present clear priorities nor were they 
very “operational”. For this reasons, donors wanted to accompany budget support with 
specific agreements on policies to be implemented and targets to be achieved with the 
provided resources. Given that there were so few joint schemes, the World Bank, the IDB and 
later also the EC negotiated separately their policy-based loans or budget support grants. To 
the extent joint schemes existed, a larger group of donors, including bilaterals, negotiated the 
Performance Assessment Matrices (PAM). But the multilateral agreements continued to exist 
alongside the joint scheme. Given the doubts that existed among donors about the extent of 
government compliance with the entry conditions (macroeconomic stability, governance and 
transparency, and poverty commitment), the number and scope of conditions was extensive. 
They not only included macroeconomic policies, tax, trade and financial reforms, and 
privatizations, but also governance reforms and social sector policies. In Nicaragua, for 
example, the first PAM contained 160 policies and targets for two years. All in all, 
conditionality was “business as usual” with the difference that sometimes more actors were 
involved on the donor side (EC and several bilateral donors) and that more sectors were 
covered. The extent of ownership can be seriously questioned. This is also clear from the 
degree of implementation. Although usually a fair amount of indicators were met, there were 
also many incidences of non-performance. 
  
With respect to government leadership of the aid process in general, and in coordinating and 
harmonizing the donors, progress has also been limited. Donors stimulated the forming of 
sector roundtables in which government and donors would discuss policies for a sector and in 
which coordination of both government and donor actions could take place. In all countries 
sector roundtables have been operating, but by no means in all years since 2001. New 
governments first had to be persuaded of the importance of aid coordination via the 
establishment of sector groups and sector plans. By the time they had their own version of the 
sector roundtables running, it was already almost time for new election campaigns. In 
addition, even when there were sector roundtables they were not always functioning well. 
Their effectiveness (in the donor view) depended on the presence of high level government 
officers, but that did not always happen. It seems that ownership of the idea of having sector 
roundtables for donor coordination was often limited to the President and a few ministers. 
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Yet, some sector plans have been elaborated, sometimes with participation of civil society. 
Examples include education sector plans in Bolivia and Nicaragua, and a sub-sector plan 
around the Education For All Initiative in Honduras. In the first two countries a few donors 
provided sector budget support for the implementation of these plans. But government 
changes also interrupted the operation of these plans and of the budget support schemes 
within it. The current governments in Bolivia and Nicaragua do not seem to be interested in 
reviving the sector roundtables. They can get their political priorities financed with aid from 
Venezuela. This is a form of leadership of the aid process, but not the one envisaged by the 
Paris Declaration. 
 
In sum, there are two reasons for the lack of progress in government leadership of the aid 
process and of donor coordination. One is the frequent government changes and political 
instability in these three countries. But another reason is the clash between the technocratic 
view of policy-making adhered to by the donors, and actual policy processes. Donors seem to 
assume that policies in recipient countries can be made by establishing long-term consensus 
and writing this down in comprehensive plans; in turn plans will then be implemented. This, 
however, is not the way policymaking proceeds in any country (Gunsteren 1976; Dijkstra 
2005). Politics is central to the making of policies and their implementation. And politics is 
the opposite of rational planning, consensus and long-term commitments. It is full of 
diverging views and conflicting values, partial interests, bargaining, compromises, short-term 
commitments, and incremental ways of solving complex issues.  
 
 
5.  Poverty reduction 
 
Isolating the effect of PRSPs or the PRS process on poverty reduction is a virtually 
impossible task.  Nonetheless, we conclude for a number of reasons that it is unlikely that the 
PRSPs or the PRS process had any significant impact on poverty levels in Bolivia, Nicaragua, 
and Honduras.   
 
A first important point is that, despite all the attention and energy spent on their creation, 
original PRSPs represented more continuity than change in government policy. The first 
poverty reduction strategies incorporated efforts that were already underway (many of which 
had begun in the 1990s and/or were financed by donors). These policies and programs were 
organized into strategies, in some cases with proposals for improving or expanding the 
programs (Komives and Dijkstra 2006). Even revised plans brought in relatively few changes 
in implemented policies. Macroeconomic policy has also not changed, despite calls for wider 
discussion and more flexibility.  
 
Once freed of the HIPC noose, governments in the three countries did set out to propose some 
changes in policy direction. In Honduras, the draft currently circulating aims to refocus the 
strategy more on production, integrated multi-sector actions, and access to assets. Some 
elements of it have started to be implemented, for example a safety net program (Red 
Solidaria) that regroups existing programs into coordinated aid packages for priority 
municipalities. In Nicaragua, President Bolaños’ NDP also focused more on conditions for 
growth. Without officially altering the PRS, President Ortega has initiated some new 
programs including free primary and secondary education; a literacy program based on the 
Cuban model; the provision of free medicines; and credits and capital transfers for small 
producers and women workers. In Bolivia, the government of President Morales has 
introduced major changes in revenue collection and distribution from the country’s mineral 
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and gas resources and pushed for a new constitution, which grants greater autonomy to 
indigenous groups. He also introduced a Cuban-inspired literacy program, a grant for children 
in public school children, and a transfer of monetary resources to priority municipalities (paid 
for with Venezuelan resources), as well as a literacy program.    
 
The implementation of these new programs has suffered, however, under excessive staff 
turnover following changes in government (Dijkstra and Komives 2008). This is a normal 
problem in all three countries, but it has been especially intense in recent years. Presidents 
Ortega and Morales reduced the nominal wages of public employees in Nicaragua and in 
Bolivia, and this has led part of the governments’ qualified technical staff to leave and find 
work elsewhere. In both countries, a limit on remunerations to external consultants was also 
introduced, which also makes it difficult for the government to hire sufficiently qualified 
temporary technical assistance from consultants.  Apart from turnover in government 
technical staff, Bolivia, Honduras, and Nicaragua have also had many changes of ministers 
and vice-ministers during current the administrations, complicating policy development and 
implementation enormously.  
 
Other problems have hampered implementation as well. In Bolivia, regional strikes and the 
focus on the constituent assembly have absorbed much of the governments’ scope for action.  
Bolivia and Nicaragua have also had problems with budget execution (Komives and Dijkstra 
2006). All three countries now have more resources to spend on poverty reduction than 
before, thanks to debt relief and improved tax collection. Nonetheless, not all the resources or 
the implementation authority are held in the central governments.  In recent years, all three 
countries have made commitments to increasing the amount of resources (and of 
responsibilities in Nicaragua) transferred to lower levels of government. None of the PRSPs, 
nor the development strategies that took their place, have been able to fully articulate a vision 
for poverty reduction that marries central government action and resources with the activities 
and resources of municipalities and departments. Nicaragua has made some progress in that 
direction with the creation of regional development plans, and, in Bolivia, there are some 
guidelines provided to municipalities on the sectoral distribution of additional spending. But, 
for the most part, poverty reduction strategies and national development plans (and efforts to 
monitor their implementation) still focus on national government. 
 
If one looks at national spending patterns during the PRS period, “pro-poor” spending (as 
defined in each country) and social spending have increased in the three countries, both in real 
terms and relative to other sectors (Komives 2006). This is consistent with what has been 
observed in Sub-Sahara Africa. In Nicaragua, for example, per-capita US$ spending on 
education increased by 50 per cent between 2000 and 2005 and on health by 30 per cent in the 
same period. It is important to note, however, that the increases in social spending partly also 
pre-date the PRS process. In Honduras, public social expenditures were approximately 35 per 
cent of total public expenditures (7 per cent of GDP) in the 1990s, 49 per cent in 2002 (9.9 
per cent of GDP), and 51 per cent in 2004 (11.8 per cent of GDP). Between 1995 and 2006 in 
Bolivia, the share of GDP dedicated to “pro-poor social spending” has grown from 9.1 per 
cent to 13.3 per cent.   
 
Budget data from the three countries provide some reasons to worry about the quality and 
effectiveness of this additional social expenditure. In Nicaragua, the category of poverty 
reduction expenditures that has a direct redistributive impact on the poor has decreased from 
56.2 per cent in 2004 to 51.6 per cent in 2006, even as total spending has increased, which 
indicates the new spending may be poorly targeted (Guimarães and Avendaño 2007). In 
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Honduras, the richest 40 per cent of households together still receive more than 30 per cent of 
PRS expenditures (Dijkstra and Komives 2008). All three countries have experienced 
decreases in capital expenditure for the social sectors. While spending in many sectors has 
increased, the budgets of some important sectors have fallen (rural development in Honduras, 
and water and sanitation in Bolivia). Despite recent calls for more attention to production and 
growth in second generation strategies, there has not yet been an increase in productive 
spending. 
 
Progress in growth, poverty reduction, and social indicators has been mixed. In Honduras, 
after some very volatile years in the 1990s and slow growth at the beginning of the new 
century, GDP grew by 6 per cent in 2006 and projections for 2007 are similar. In Bolivia, 
after some 8 years of 4-5 per cent annual growth rates, the first Asian crisis (1998) and its 
collateral effects in Chile, Brazil, and Argentina reduced both economic growth (to a rate of 
less than 2 per cent) and tax revenue at the same time. Since then, the growth rate has risen 
again, reaching more than 4 per cent in 2006. Importantly, improved growth in Honduras and 
Bolivia has more to do with a favourable international context than to having found a strategy 
to deal with shocks to the economy. In Nicaragua, the average GDP growth rate has been 
lower in the last six years than in the final years of the 1990s. In 2006, the growth rate was 3.7 
per cent (and 2.4 per cent in per-capita GDP) and a lower rate is expected in 2007. The 
relatively poor growth performance in Nicaragua is ironic given that Nicaragua’s second 
PRSP was a growth-focused strategy, too focused on plain growth at the expense of poverty 
reduction according to many critics. 
 
In Latin America in general, the new millennium has not seen significant reductions in 
monetary poverty rates (IDB 2004), and from available data, it appears that Bolivia, 
Honduras, and Nicaragua are no exceptions. In Honduras, statistics published by the SIERP 
(System of PRS Indicators) indicate that the monetary poverty rate remained practically 
unchanged between 2001 and 2005 before dropping in 2006 and 2007 to just over 60 per cent. 
Extreme poverty decreased, from 48.4 per cent to 37 per cent. At the same time, inequality 
has actually increased since the beginning of the PRS process. In Bolivia, the National 
Statistics Institute (INE) reports that the monetary poverty rate rose from 62.6 per cent in 
1999 to 67.3 per cent in 2003. Rates are falling again, down to near 60 per cent in 2006. The 
incidence of extreme poverty fell between 2000 and 2004 but rose again to 38 per cent in 
2005. In Nicaragua, there were long delays in publishing updated poverty statistics, but 
figures now indicate that between 2001 and 2005 poverty conditions worsened to the point 
where current poverty and extreme poverty levels are similar to those of 1998. Better news is 
the fact that inequality has decreased slightly between 1998 and 2005.  
 
As in sub-Sahara Africa and other parts of Latin America, most social indicators are generally 
improving. The three countries have had success, both before and after the beginning of the 
PRS process, in extending basic services to the population. Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Honduras 
do not stand out either for their good or poor results in social indicators as compared to the 
rest of Latin America (see for example Figures 1 and 2, and Table 5) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
Figure 1. Infant Mortality Rate for Children Under Five, Per 1000 Births 
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Figure2. Percentage of Population with Potable Water in Rural Areas 
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Table 5. Social indicators 
 
 Bolivia 
 
Nicaragua 
 
Honduras 
 
Sub-Sahara 
Africa 
  2000 2006 2000 2006 2000 2006 2000 2006 
Primary enrollment, gross 115 109 101 116 107 118 78 94 
Ratio of female to male 
primary enrollment 
99 100 101 98 101 99 85 89 
Primary completion rate 99 101 66 73  89 49 60 
Primary completion rate, 
female 
94 100 70 77  91 44 55 
Infant mortality rate 63 50 34 29 32 23 100 94 
Improved water source 82 86 77 79 80 84 55 58 
Source: World Bank, Poverty data: Supplement to WDI 2008. 
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5.  Conclusions 
 
It is hard to compare this Latin American experience with the African experience, as there are 
of course many differences between countries of the same region. Yet, some general 
similarities and differences can be observed. It seems that ownership of the first PRSPs, 
written to access the HIPC relief, was limited in all countries of all regions. In Africa there 
were usually no government changes after the first PRSP, and governments, dependent as 
they were on donor-financing, wrote APRs and usually also elaborated a second PRSP. 
Ownership of these second or third strategies seems to have varied. But full ownership can be 
doubted, as there was usually a wide split between the strategies on paper, and actual policies 
and government spending. In Latin America, the government changes were accompanied by 
new strategies that were much more owned by incumbent governments. But these owned 
plans were not always accepted by donors, leading to an unclear situation in which both 
governments and donors practiced “business as usual” - with limited implementation of 
whatever strategy. The frequent government changes forced donors to recognize that there 
was not a one-to-one relationship between the existence of a PRSP and government 
commitment with poverty reduction - while this was not the case in Africa.   
 
While a general conclusion for both regions can be that participatory processes had limited 
influence on actual national strategies, the Latin American experience shows that participation 
can have an important impact in itself. In all countries civil society organizations were 
strengthened by the donor funding that accompanied participatory processes. In Bolivia some 
of these organizations became capable of expulsing several Presidents, and ultimately in 
bringing their leader to the Presidency during regular elections. In Honduras the participatory 
process led to some institutionalized policy space for civil society representatives, and in 
Nicaragua civil society could exert influence on some of the regional, sector or local plans - 
which higher chances of being implemented than the national strategies. All this seems to go 
beyond the effects of participatory processes in Sub-Sahara Africa. One important explanation 
may be that there was already a more independent and active civil society movement at the 
start of the PRS process. Donor support for this movement did have effects - though these 
effects were not always as intended. 
 
In the area of partnership, there is an essential difference between the two regions. In Sub-
Sahara Africa there has been a larger shift from project aid to general and sector budget 
support - although the share of the latter modalities is still small in relation to the total. The 
slower progress in Latin America is partly related to frequent government changes, which 
destroyed the illusion of government ownership and commitment to the strategies. It also 
made stable working relations with governments more difficult, both at national and at sector 
level. But the slower progress in Latin America was also due to the larger presence of donors 
that are less in favour of this modality. 
 
In terms of results, there do not seem to be large differences between the poor countries in the 
two regions. All countries register small improvements in social indicators and most 
(Nicaragua is an exception) also reductions in poverty. But this may as well have been in spite 
of, and not due to the PRS process. At least in Latin America it is clear that during this whole 
period, much time and effort has been invested in negotiating (between donors, civil society 
and governments) the content of the plans, but much less attention has been given to their 
implementation. This is due to a combination of several factors, including lack of national 
ownership over the strategies, weak execution capacity, the low priority given to poverty 
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reduction in some cases, and political instability in other cases. But there has also been a clash 
between two mindsets: that of donors with an emphasis on scientific, comprehensive, and 
long-term planning; and the national mindset of formulating short-term political priorities and 
trying to achieve them with the political and economic alliances that are available. 
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